[Par-reg] for Parshat metzora

Thu Apr 7 14:39:37 EDT 2011

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     THE TANACH STUDY CENTER [http://www.tanach.org]

          In Memory of Rabbi Abraham Leibtag

     Shiurim in Chumash & Navi by Menachem Leibtag

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           for PARSHAT METZORA  & KI-TETZEH  

     There are two psukim in Parshat Ki-tetzeh that can be

understood in many different ways, yet no matter how we

interpret them, their underlying message is especially

important for the month of Elul (and the rest of the year
as

well).  In the following shiur, we take a break from our

thematic study of Sefer Devarim, to delve into the world
of

'parshanut' [Biblical commentary].

INTRODUCTION

     Although most of the laws in Parshat Ki-Tetzeh deal
with

'mitzvot bein adam le-chavero' [man and his fellow man],
one

exception calls our attention:

  "Be very careful with regard to [the laws concerning] a

  'nega tzara'at' (a type of skin infection) - do exactly

  as the levitical priests instruct you" (24:8).

  This sort of warning - to observe the laws of 'tzara'at'

[leprosy] - is certainly an anomaly in Sefer Devarim.

  First of all, the laws of leprosy were first presented
in

Sefer Vayikra (see chapters 13 &14) together with numerous

other laws of 'tum'a' & 'tahara' [spiritual
uncleanliness].

However, Sefer Devarim does not remind us concerning any
of

those laws (nor any other laws from the first 18 chapters
of

Sefer Vayikra), other than this lone mention to keep the
laws

of tzara'at.

  Secondly, most all of the other laws in Parshat Ki
Tetzeh

deal with 'bein adam la-Makom' [matters between man and
God],

while this warning seems to be quite different.

  Finally, this pasuk doesn't appear to teach us anything
new.

     Therefore, when studying this pasuk, we must consider

these three issues: i.e.  1) Why do we find here a mitzva
bein

adam la-Makom?  2) What specific law is being added that
has

not already appeared in Sefer Vayikra?   3) Why does Sefer

Devarim introduce, uncharacteristically, a law from the
first

half of Sefer Vayikra?

LEPROSY & MIRIAM [Rashi]

     The simplest answer to the above questions is based
on

its connection to the next pasuk:

  "Remember what God did to Miriam, on your journey when

  you left the land of Egypt" (24:9).

     This pasuk clearly refers to the incident recorded in

Parshat Beha'alotcha, when Miriam contracts tzara'at
following

her complaints regarding Moshe's marriage to an 'isha
kushit'

(see Bamidbar 12:1-16).

  This juxtaposition of the commandment to remember how
Miriam

was punished with tzara'at for speaking 'lashon ha-ra'
[evil

talk] against her brother, leads many commentators to the

obvious conclusion that the Torah's 'reminder' concerning

tzara'at is in essence a reminder not to slander.  In
other

words, by reminding us not to speak lashon ha-ra
immediately

after the warning concerning the laws of tzara'at, the
Torah

seems to enlist the laws of tzara'at as a (polite)
reminder

not to speak lashon ha-ra!

     For example, Rashi's opening commentary to this pasuk

seems to make exactly this point:

       ["Remember what God did to Miriam" (24:9):]

  "If one wants to be careful not to contract tzara'at at

  all - then don't speak lashon ha-ra [in the first
place].

  Remember what happened to Miriam when she spoke against

  her brother..." (see Rashi 24:9).

     Not only does this interpretation reveal the
underlying

significance of these laws, it also answers the questions

raised earlier.  The laws of tzara'at are mentioned in
Parshat

Ki Tetzeh specifically because they in fact do relate to
bein

adam le-chavero!  It also explains why the pasuk here
includes

only a very general warning concerning tzara'at, to get to
the

point of lashon ha-ra.  However, there is no need to
repeat

the technical details of tzara'at, as they have already
been

discussed in Sefer Vayikra.

DRASH = PSHAT [Ibn Ezra]

     It is worthwhile to note in this context Ibn Ezra's

comments on this pasuk.  Not only does he apparently agree

with Rashi's interpretation, he even adds a comment that
the

pshat of these psukim in Devarim, supports a midrashic

interpretation in Sefer Vayikra:

  "From here (this pasuk) we find support for the midrash

  (of Vayikra Rabba 16:1): don't read 'MeTZo'RA' - rather

  'MoTZi shem RA'" (a cute abbreviation).

     In other words, Ibn Ezra (a big 'fan' of pshat) finds

support for the midrash in Sefer Vayikra concerning the
laws

of metzora based on the pshat of the psukim in Sefer
Devarim!

NOT SO FAST

     Despite the simplicity and beauty of this
interpretation,

several serious questions emerge.

     First of all, why doesn't the Torah just tell us
'don't

speak lashon ha-ra?  What is gained by merely inferring
this

conclusion from the story of Miriam and the laws of
tzara'at?

     Furthermore, does it make sense for the Torah to
recall a

'bad story' concerning Miriam in order to teach us not to
tell

'bad stories' about other people?!

     Finally, why does the Torah emphasize (in 24:8) that
we

must follow the procedures specifically in accordance with
the

kohanim's instructions?  If the message is simply not to
speak

lashon ha-ra, the first half of the pasuk would have
sufficed

as ample warning.

     Due to these difficulties, Rashbam & Chizkuni will

explain these two psukim in a radically different manner.
On

the other hand, Rashi and Ramban will remain 'loyal' to
the

lashon ha-ra approach; however, their commentaries will

reflect how they grappled with these difficulties as well.

  [It is highly recommend that you first study (or at
least

  read) those commentaries on your own before continuing.]

DON'T BE YOUR OWN DOCTOR!  [Rashi]

     Let's begin with the 'simple' question: If 24:8
simply

serves as a general warning to follow the proper
procedures

regarding tzara'at (as we concluded above), then it would
have

sufficed to say, "Be careful to keep the laws of
tzara'at."

What are we to learn from the second clause: "follow
exactly

what the levitical priests instruct you" (see 24:8)?

     Based on this redundancy, the Gemara in Makkot (22a)

concludes that this pasuk includes more than just a
general

warning; rather it teaches us an additional law.  Rashi
cites

the Gemara's explanation that this pasuk forbids an
individual

to surgically remove a tzara'at infection from his skin
(by

himself) before showing it to the kohen.

     Basically, according to this interpretation, this
pasuk

teaches us that one 'cannot be his own doctor' with regard
to

tzara'at.  Instead, he must show his infection to the
kohen

(priest) and obediently follow the kohen's 'diagnosis'.

     Here we find a classic example of midrash halacha.

Chazal derive an additional halacha (which does not appear

explicitly in the text) from an 'extra' phrase in a pasuk,

based on the content and context of the otherwise
superfluous

expression.

  [It is important to note that this midrash halacha does

  not contradict our earlier conclusion concerning the

  connection between tzara'at and lashon ha-ra; it simply

  adds an additional law.  Note that Rashi brings down
both

  interpretations!  See also Further Iyun section.]

     Let's continue now with the more obvious question:
i.e.

what does the Torah gain by recalling the incident with

Miriam?  Would it not have been more effective to simply

admonish in straightforward fashion: 'Don't speak lashon
ha-

ra'?

     Most probably for this reason, Rashbam and Chizkuni's

suggest a very different approach.

NO ONE IS ABOVE THE LAW!  [Rashbam]

      In contrast to the approach of Rashi & Ibn Ezra (and
our

original explanation), that the primary purpose of these

psukim is to prohibit lashon ha-ra, Rashbam points us in a

totally different direction.  Let's take a look:

  "Be careful to keep the laws of tzara'at: [This comes to

  teach us that] even with regard to [an important person]

  like King Uziyahu - do not honor him (should he become a

  metzora / see Divrei Hayamim II 26:11-22).  Instead,
send

  him outside the camp [as Miriam was sent]. for remember

  what happened to Miriam: Even though she was a
prophetess

  and Moshe's sister, they did not honor her; instead,
they

  sent her outside the camp..."

    [See Rashbam 24:8-9 / In that story in Divrei Hayamim,

    King Uziyahu was struck with tzara'at after he
haughtily

    entered the kodesh kodashim to offer ketoret.]

     According to Rashbam, the primary focus of these
psukim

relates indeed to the laws of leprosy and 'protektzia' -
and

hence has nothing to do with lashon ha-ra.

  Note how this interpretation resolves almost all our

questions (raised above).  Although the technical details
of

tzara'at have already been recorded in Sefer Vayikra,
Sefer

Devarim (in its discussion of various laws concerning
daily

life in the community of Israel) commands us not to make
any

exceptions for special people - i.e. no 'protektzia'!

     Hence, the Torah mentions the case of Miriam to
emphasize

precisely this point of 'no exceptions' (with regard to

tzara'at).  We cannot, therefore, according to Rashbam,
infer

from these psukim a conclusive connection between the
cause

for tzara'at and lashon ha-ra.

     Note as well that the story of Miriam in Parshat

Beha'alotcha provides only 'circumstantial evidence' for
such

a connection.  Recall that the Torah never states
explicitly

that lashon ha-ra was the cause of Miraim's leprosy!  In
fact,

most other occurrences of tzara'at in Tanach involve the

problem of 'ga'ava' [arrogance] - e.g. the cases of
Uziyahu

(see Divrei Hayamim II 26:16-20) and Na'aman and Gechazi
(see

Melachim II chapter 5).  See also Shmot 4:6-8,
'Ve-akmal'.]

     Rashbam is not alone in his approach.  Chizkuni (on
24:8-

9) explains these psukim in a similar fashion:

  "Keep the laws of tzara'at: Do not grant special honor
to

  important people by exempting them from banishment from

  the camp.  Remember what God did to Miriam - even though

  she was sister to the king and high priest, she was

  nevertheless banished outside the camp for the entire

  seven-day period."

  Rashbam and Chizkuni agree that the primary purpose of
these

psukim is to teach us that everyone is equal under the
law,

and hence, not to make exceptions for VIP's.  Note, that
this

approach as well provides us with a good reason for
including

this law in Parshat Ki Tetzeh, as it falls into the
category

of bein adam le-chavero, and it reflects God's expectation

that Am Yisrael live by higher moral standard.

     How about Ramban?  We've intentionally saved him for

last, because his approach (as usual) is the most

comprehensive, addressing textual and thematic parallels
to

other parshiot in Chumash.  We will show how his approach
(in

this case) is both 'educational' like Rashi's and faithful
to

pshat no less than Rashbam's.

  [Incidentally, this is why Ramban's commentary is
usually

  much longer and complex than Rashi's.  On the other
hand,

  specifically because of his brevity, Rashi has earned

  more widespread popularity.]

REMEMBER THE OTHER 'ZACHOR'S'!  [Ramban]

     Note, that just about all of the interpretations of
24:8-

9 thus far how considered the warning to follow the laws
of

leprosy in 24:8 ['hi-shamer...'] as the primary point- and
the

'reminder' to remember what happened to Miriam in 24:9

['zachor...'] as secondary.  Ramban will do exactly the

opposite, showing how the Torah's primary commandment is

zachor in 24:9, and hishamer in 24:8 simply serves as a
lead

up to the primary point in 24:9!

     Ramban begins by quoting Rashi's explanation that

guarding one's tongue against lashon hara prevents the
onset

of tzara'at; and (for a change), this time Ramban actually

quotes Rashi because he agrees (and not as a set up to

disagree).  However, Ramban takes Rashi's approach one
step

further, demonstrating that what Rashi considers 'drash'
may

be not only 'pshat', but should even be counted as one of
the

613 mitzvot!

  "In my opinion this [commandment of zachor in pasuk
24:9]

  should be considered a positive commandment - [i.e. it

  should be counted as] an actual mitzvat aseh" [see
Ramban

  24:9].

     To our amazement, Ramban considers zachor - what
appeared

to be simply a 'reminder' - as a positive commandment to
daily

remember (or possibly even recite) the incident involving
how

Miriam contracted tzara'at after speaking about her
brother.

  How does Ramban reach such a daring conclusion that this

should be counted as one of the 613 mitzvot!?

     One could suggest that Ramban's approach stems from
his

'sensitive ear' to the Torah's use of key phrases.  When

Ramban hears the opening phrase: "Zachor et asher asa

Hashem..." he is immediately reminded of three other
instances

where the Torah introduces a mitzva with a similar
expression:

* 1) Shabbat - "Zachor et yom ha-shabbat" (Shmot 20:7)

* 2) Yetziat Mitzrayim - "Zachor et ha-yom..." (Shmot
13:3)

* 3) amalek - "Zachor et asher asa lecha Amalek..."

         (see Devarim  25:17)

     Ramban cites these three examples as proof that a
pasuk

beginning with the word zachor... constitutes a positive

commandment (a 'mitzvat aseh'); and hence, our case should
be

no different.

     But what is this mitzva?  Why would the Torah have us

remember a 'not so nice' story about Miriam?

     Like an artist, Ramban beautifully 'puts all the
pieces

together,' explaining this seemingly enigmatic pasuk in
light

of our earlier questions.  Like Rashi and Ibn Ezra, he
points

to lashon ha-ra as the central topic of these psukim.
This is

why the incident of Miriam is introduced and why the issue
of

tzara'at is mentioned altogether in Parshat Ki-Tetzeh, in
the

context of mitzvot bein adam le-chavero.

  However, Ramban's interpretation also explains the
advantage

of employing Miriam to present this mitzva (rather than

stating it explicitly):

  "... Hence, this is a warning (of the Torah) not to
speak

  lashon ha-ra, commanding us to remember the terrible

  punishment that Miriam received [even though she was] a

  righteous prophetess, and she spoke only about her

  brother (not someone outside the family) and only

  privately with her brother (Aharon), not in public, so

  that Moshe himself would not be embarrassed... But

  despite these good intentions, she was punished.  How

  much more so must we be careful never to speak lashon
ha-

  ra... (see Ramban 24:9).

     According to Ramban, the Torah doesn't mention Miriam
to

tell us how bad her sin was.  On the contrary, the
incident of

Miriam (who, as everyone knows, was righteous and had only

good intentions) emphasizes how careful we must all be in
all

matters which may involve even the slightest degree of
lashon

ha-ra.  This pasuk reminds us that punishment was
administered

even in the case of Miriam's mild lashon ha-ra.

     Based on the parallel to other instances of the word

zachor, the Ramban concludes that mere recollection does
not

suffice.  We are obligated to verbally recount this

unfortunate incident every day [just as Kiddush on Shabbat

fulfills the obligation of 'zachor et yom ha-shabbat

lekadsho...']!  Ramban understands these psukim as not
merely

some good advice, but as a commandment to retell this
incident

on a daily basis, in order that we remember not to make a

similar mistake, even should we have 'good intentions'.

  [See also Sifra on Vayikra 26:14 [Torat Kohanim

  Bechukotai Alef 2-3].  This probably explains the

  'minhag' [custom] of reciting this pasuk each day after

  shacharit - see the six 'zechirot' at the conclusion of

  shacharit in your siddur!]

     Ramban's closing remarks are most significant, as
they

reflect another important aspect of his exegetical
approach:

  "For how could it be that lashon ha-ra - which is

  equivalent in its severity to murder - would not be

  considered a [full fledged] mitzva in the Torah! ...

    Rather, this pasuk serves as a serious warning to

  refrain [from lashon ha-ra], be it in public or in

  private, intentional or unintentional...and it should be

  considered one of the 613 mitzvot..." (see Ramban 24:9).

     Ramban here employs 'conceptual logic' - the very
essence

of his pshat approach - to support his comprehensive

interpretation of these psukim.  Because logically there
must

be a mitzva in the Torah against speaking lashon ha-ra,
Ramban

prefers to interpret this pasuk as one of the 613 mitzvot.

  In this manner, Ramban utilizes a wider perspective of
pshat

to reach a conclusion not only similar to the Midrash, but

also more poignant.

  [If you would like to see an 'enhanced version' of

  Ramban's explanation of this mitzva, read his commentary

  to Rambam's Sefer Ha-mitzvot.  At the conclusion of the

  'mitzvot aseh' section, Ramban adds several mitzvot
which

  (in his opinion) Rambam had overlooked.  In 'hasaga' #7,

  Ramban adds this mitzva, that we must constantly remind

  ourselves of the incident of Miriam in order to remember

  not to speak lashon ha-ra.]

An 'AM' KADOSH with a 'PEH' KADOSH

     Note as well that according to Ramban's
interpretation,

the mitzva which emerges from these two psukim in Parshat
Ki

Tetzeh is not only yet another mitzva bein adam
le-chavero, it

also forms one of the most basic 'building block' towards

achieving the ultimate goal of Sefer Devarim to create and

establish an am kadosh.

  Recall how the mitzvot of the main speech form the

guidelines for the establishment of God's model nation in
the

land of Israel.  Imagine an entire nation, where each

individual reminded himself daily of these stringent

guidelines concerning lashon ha-ra!

     Anyone who would like to be 'machmir' [adhere to a
more

stringent opinion] - especially on the 'de-'oraita' level,
is

invited to take upon himself this 'chumra' [stringency]

explicated by Ramban.

                              shabbat shalom,

                              menachem

==========================

FOR FURTHER IYUN

A.  Try to arrange the various opinions of the Rishonim

mentioned above into the following categories.  Who
considers:

     1) 24:8 is the primary pasuk - 24:9 supports it.

    2) 24:9 is the primary pasuk - 24:8 introduces it.

     3) 24:8-9 should be read together, like one long
pasuk.

B.  Carefully review Rashbam and Chizkuni's comments on
our

psukim.  According to them, to whom is the prohibition in
24:8

directed?  According to Rashi / Ramban?

     A corresponding debate exists regarding Vayikra 13:2:
"Ve-

huva el Aharon ha-kohen." ("He shall be brought before

Aharon.").  See Sefer Hachinuch 169 as opposed to the
Rosh's

commentary on Masechet Zavim 3:2.

C.  We noted Chazal's Midrash Halacha that interprets the

first of our two psukim as forbidding the surgical
detachment

of a tzara'at infection.  As we pointed out, Rashi adopts
this

peirush of that pasuk, despite the fact that he
understands

the reference to tzara'at here as primarily related to
lashon

ha-ra.

       The question, of course, arises, why would the
Torah

mention specifically this particular detail of the laws of

tzara'at if the main focus here is on lashon ha-ra?  Why
is

this prohibition singled out from all of hilchot tzara'at
for

mention here in the context of the prohibition of lashon
ha-

ra?

     Try to answer this question by reviewing the general

process imposed upon the metzora.  See Rashi, Vayikra
13:47 &

14:4.  In light of this, explain the prohibition of
removing a

tzara'at infection and how this may reflect the severity
of

lashon ha-ra.  Bear in mind as well that the Ramban here

(24:8) extends this prohibition beyond severing the
infection,

to mere refusal to show it to the kohen (thus avoiding the

entire process).

     In honor of Elul, relate this concept to the process
of

'teshuva' in general.

D.  Those Rishonim who do not derive the prohibition of

removing a tzara'at infection from 24:8 (as the Gemara in

Makkot does) would presumably derive the prohibition from

Vayikra 13:33 - see Torat Kohanim there.  Based on the
context

of that pasuk, what advantage is there to learning the

prohibition from our pasuk instead?  What might be the

difference between these two prohibitions?  See Sefer

Hachinuch 170, as opposed to Ramban in his 'hasagot' to

Rambam's Sefer Hamitzvot lo ta'aseh 307-8. [There is also
some

question as to the precise text of that passage in Torat

Kohanim - see Sefer Hachinuch's citation of Torat Kohanim
in

mitzva 170 and Torah Shleima, Vayikra 13:109.]

E.  Recall that according to Rashbam and Chizkuni, 24:9

teaches us not to make exceptions for public figures with

regard to the laws of tzara'at.  Review their comments and

note that the 'hava amina' (original possibility) of
exempting

leaders from these laws evolved from the honor and respect
due

to them.  We may, however, add another element to this
hava

amina: national interests.  A nation would understandably
be

very reluctant to quarantine an important public official
for

an indefinite period of time.  Explain how, along the
lines of

the Rashbam & Chizkuni but with our variation, we may
explain

a seemingly superfluous phrase in the pasuk: ". on your

journey when you left the land of Egypt." (For a subtle
hint,

see Targum Yonatan's explanation of this phrase.)
Consider

especially the final clause of Bemidbar 12:15.  (If you
want

to cheat, look up Rav Zalman Sorotzkin's 'Oznayim
La-Torah' on

our pasuk.)

F.  For an interesting twist, see Targum Yonatan Ben Uziel
on

24:9.  According to his understanding, what sin does this

pasuk address?  Is this wrongdoing related to lashon
ha-ra?

Based on this Targum Yonatan, explain more fully Rashi's

comments on Shemot 4:6.

G.  Note that the mitzva of 'kil'ayim' (see 22:9-12) is

another mitzva bein adam la-Makom, and hence seems out of

place in Parshat Ki Tetzeh.  Based on the various laws

concerning forbidden marriages which continue in
22:13-23:9,

can you suggest a thematic connection between these
mitzvot?

     In this context, note Ramban's association between
the

prohibition of plowing with an ox and donkey (pasuk 10)
and

that of interbreeding (Vayikra 19:19).  See also Rambam,
Moreh

Nevuchim 3:49, who explicitly bases the prohibition here
with

the halacha forbidding interbreeding.  [Regarding
sha'atnez,

however, he offers a much different explanation - Moreh

Nevuchim 3:37.]

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