[Par-reg] for Parshat Kiteze - additional shiur
Menachem Leibtag
tsc at bezeqint.net
Thu Sep 4 16:11:01 EDT 2014
*********************************************
****************
THE TANACH STUDY CENTER
[http://www.tanach.org]
In Memory of Rabbi Abraham Leibtag
Shiurim in Chumash & Navi by Menachem
Leibtag
*********************************************
****************
for PARSHAT KI-TETZEH [& CHODESH
ELUL!]
There are two psukim in this week's
Sedra that can be
understood in many different ways, yet no
matter how we
interpret them, their underlying message is
especially
important for the month of Elul (and the rest
of the year as
well). In the following shiur, we take a
break from our
thematic study of Sefer Devarim, to delve
into the world of
'parshanut' [Biblical commentary].
INTRODUCTION
Although most of the laws in Parshat
Ki-Tetzeh deal with
'mitzvot bein adam le-chavero' [man and his
fellow man], one
exception calls our attention:
"Be very careful with regard to [the laws
concerning] a
'nega tzara'at' (a type of skin infection)
- do exactly
as the levitical priests instruct you"
(24:8).
This sort of warning - to observe the laws
of 'tzara'at'
[leprosy] - is certainly an anomaly in Sefer
Devarim.
First of all, the laws of leprosy were
first presented in
Sefer Vayikra (see chapters 13 &14) together
with numerous
other laws of 'tum'a' & 'tahara' [spiritual
uncleanliness].
However, Sefer Devarim does not remind us
concerning any of
those laws (nor any other laws from the first
18 chapters of
Sefer Vayikra), other than this lone mention
to keep the laws
of tzara'at.
Secondly, most all of the other laws in
Parshat Ki Tetzeh
deal with 'bein adam la-Makom' [matters
between man and God],
while this warning seems to be quite
different.
Finally, this pasuk doesn't appear to teach
us anything new.
Therefore, when studying this pasuk, we
must consider
these three issues: i.e. 1) Why do we find
here a mitzva bein
adam la-Makom? 2) What specific law is being
added that has
not already appeared in Sefer Vayikra? 3)
Why does Sefer
Devarim introduce, uncharacteristically, a
law from the first
half of Sefer Vayikra?
LEPROSY & MIRIAM [Rashi]
The simplest answer to the above
questions is based on
its connection to the next pasuk:
"Remember what God did to Miriam, on your
journey when
you left the land of Egypt" (24:9).
This pasuk clearly refers to the
incident recorded in
Parshat Beha'alotcha, when Miriam contracts
tzara'at following
her complaints regarding Moshe's marriage to
an 'isha kushit'
(see Bamidbar 12:1-16).
This juxtaposition of the commandment to
remember how Miriam
was punished with tzara'at for speaking
'lashon ha-ra' [evil
talk] against her brother, leads many
commentators to the
obvious conclusion that the Torah's
'reminder' concerning
tzara'at is in essence a reminder not to
slander. In other
words, by reminding us not to speak lashon
ha-ra immediately
after the warning concerning the laws of
tzara'at, the Torah
seems to enlist the laws of tzara'at as a
(polite) reminder
not to speak lashon ha-ra!
For example, Rashi's opening commentary
to this pasuk
seems to make exactly this point:
["Remember what God did to Miriam"
(24:9):]
"If one wants to be careful not to contract
tzara'at at
all - then don't speak lashon ha-ra [in the
first place].
Remember what happened to Miriam when she
spoke against
her brother..." (see Rashi 24:9).
Not only does this interpretation reveal
the underlying
significance of these laws, it also answers
the questions
raised earlier. The laws of tzara'at are
mentioned in Parshat
Ki Tetzeh specifically because they in fact
do relate to bein
adam le-chavero! It also explains why the
pasuk here includes
only a very general warning concerning
tzara'at, to get to the
point of lashon ha-ra. However, there is no
need to repeat
the technical details of tzara'at, as they
have already been
discussed in Sefer Vayikra.
DRASH = PSHAT [Ibn Ezra]
It is worthwhile to note in this context
Ibn Ezra's
comments on this pasuk. Not only does he
apparently agree
with Rashi's interpretation, he even adds a
comment that the
pshat of these psukim in Devarim, supports a
midrashic
interpretation in Sefer Vayikra:
"From here (this pasuk) we find support for
the midrash
(of Vayikra Rabba 16:1): don't read
'MeTZo'RA' - rather
'MoTZi shem RA'" (a cute abbreviation).
In other words, Ibn Ezra (a big 'fan' of
pshat) finds
support for the midrash in Sefer Vayikra
concerning the laws
of metzora based on the pshat of the psukim
in Sefer Devarim!
NOT SO FAST
Despite the simplicity and beauty of
this interpretation,
several serious questions emerge.
First of all, why doesn't the Torah just
tell us 'don't
speak lashon ha-ra? What is gained by merely
inferring this
conclusion from the story of Miriam and the
laws of tzara'at?
Furthermore, does it make sense for the
Torah to recall a
'bad story' concerning Miriam in order to
teach us not to tell
'bad stories' about other people?!
Finally, why does the Torah emphasize
(in 24:8) that we
must follow the procedures specifically in
accordance with the
kohanim's instructions? If the message is
simply not to speak
lashon ha-ra, the first half of the pasuk
would have sufficed
as ample warning.
Due to these difficulties, Rashbam &
Chizkuni will
explain these two psukim in a radically
different manner. On
the other hand, Rashi and Ramban will remain
'loyal' to the
lashon ha-ra approach; however, their
commentaries will
reflect how they grappled with these
difficulties as well.
[It is highly recommend that you first
study (or at least
read) those commentaries on your own before
continuing.]
DON'T BE YOUR OWN DOCTOR! [Rashi]
Let's begin with the 'simple' question:
If 24:8 simply
serves as a general warning to follow the
proper procedures
regarding tzara'at (as we concluded above),
then it would have
sufficed to say, "Be careful to keep the laws
of tzara'at."
What are we to learn from the second clause:
"follow exactly
what the levitical priests instruct you" (see
24:8)?
Based on this redundancy, the Gemara in
Makkot (22a)
concludes that this pasuk includes more than
just a general
warning; rather it teaches us an additional
law. Rashi cites
the Gemara's explanation that this pasuk
forbids an individual
to surgically remove a tzara'at infection
from his skin (by
himself) before showing it to the kohen.
Basically, according to this
interpretation, this pasuk
teaches us that one 'cannot be his own
doctor' with regard to
tzara'at. Instead, he must show his
infection to the kohen
(priest) and obediently follow the kohen's
'diagnosis'.
Here we find a classic example of
midrash halacha.
Chazal derive an additional halacha (which
does not appear
explicitly in the text) from an 'extra'
phrase in a pasuk,
based on the content and context of the
otherwise superfluous
expression.
[It is important to note that this midrash
halacha does
not contradict our earlier conclusion
concerning the
connection between tzara'at and lashon
ha-ra; it simply
adds an additional law. Note that Rashi
brings down both
interpretations! See also Further Iyun
section.]
Let's continue now with the more obvious
question: i.e.
what does the Torah gain by recalling the
incident with
Miriam? Would it not have been more
effective to simply
admonish in straightforward fashion: 'Don't
speak lashon ha-
ra'?
Most probably for this reason, Rashbam
and Chizkuni's
suggest a very different approach.
NO ONE IS ABOVE THE LAW! [Rashbam]
In contrast to the approach of Rashi &
Ibn Ezra (and our
original explanation), that the primary
purpose of these
psukim is to prohibit lashon ha-ra, Rashbam
points us in a
totally different direction. Let's take a
look:
"Be careful to keep the laws of tzara'at:
[This comes to
teach us that] even with regard to [an
important person]
like King Uziyahu - do not honor him
(should he become a
metzora / see Divrei Hayamim II 26:11-22).
Instead, send
him outside the camp [as Miriam was sent].
for remember
what happened to Miriam: Even though she
was a prophetess
and Moshe's sister, they did not honor her;
instead, they
sent her outside the camp..."
[See Rashbam 24:8-9 / In that story in
Divrei Hayamim,
King Uziyahu was struck with tzara'at
after he haughtily
entered the kodesh kodashim to offer
ketoret.]
According to Rashbam, the primary focus
of these psukim
relates indeed to the laws of leprosy and
'protektzia' - and
hence has nothing to do with lashon ha-ra.
Note how this interpretation resolves
almost all our
questions (raised above). Although the
technical details of
tzara'at have already been recorded in Sefer
Vayikra, Sefer
Devarim (in its discussion of various laws
concerning daily
life in the community of Israel) commands us
not to make any
exceptions for special people - i.e. no
'protektzia'!
Hence, the Torah mentions the case of
Miriam to emphasize
precisely this point of 'no exceptions' (with
regard to
tzara'at). We cannot, therefore, according
to Rashbam, infer
from these psukim a conclusive connection
between the cause
for tzara'at and lashon ha-ra.
Note as well that the story of Miriam in
Parshat
Beha'alotcha provides only 'circumstantial
evidence' for such
a connection. Recall that the Torah never
states explicitly
that lashon ha-ra was the cause of Miraim's
leprosy! In fact,
most other occurrences of tzara'at in Tanach
involve the
problem of 'ga'ava' [arrogance] - e.g. the
cases of Uziyahu
(see Divrei Hayamim II 26:16-20) and Na'aman
and Gechazi (see
Melachim II chapter 5). See also Shmot
4:6-8, 'Ve-akmal'.]
Rashbam is not alone in his approach.
Chizkuni (on 24:8-
9) explains these psukim in a similar
fashion:
"Keep the laws of tzara'at: Do not grant
special honor to
important people by exempting them from
banishment from
the camp. Remember what God did to Miriam
- even though
she was sister to the king and high priest,
she was
nevertheless banished outside the camp for
the entire
seven-day period."
Rashbam and Chizkuni agree that the primary
purpose of these
psukim is to teach us that everyone is equal
under the law,
and hence, not to make exceptions for VIP's.
Note, that this
approach as well provides us with a good
reason for including
this law in Parshat Ki Tetzeh, as it falls
into the category
of bein adam le-chavero, and it reflects
God's expectation
that Am Yisrael live by higher moral
standard.
How about Ramban? We've intentionally
saved him for
last, because his approach (as usual) is the
most
comprehensive, addressing textual and
thematic parallels to
other parshiot in Chumash. We will show how
his approach (in
this case) is both 'educational' like Rashi's
and faithful to
pshat no less than Rashbam's.
[Incidentally, this is why Ramban's
commentary is usually
much longer and complex than Rashi's. On
the other hand,
specifically because of his brevity, Rashi
has earned
more widespread popularity.]
REMEMBER THE OTHER 'ZACHOR'S'! [Ramban]
Note, that just about all of the
interpretations of 24:8-
9 thus far how considered the warning to
follow the laws of
leprosy in 24:8 ['hi-shamer...'] as the
primary point- and the
'reminder' to remember what happened to
Miriam in 24:9
['zachor...'] as secondary. Ramban will do
exactly the
opposite, showing how the Torah's primary
commandment is
zachor in 24:9, and hishamer in 24:8 simply
serves as a lead
up to the primary point in 24:9!
Ramban begins by quoting Rashi's
explanation that
guarding one's tongue against lashon hara
prevents the onset
of tzara'at; and (for a change), this time
Ramban actually
quotes Rashi because he agrees (and not as a
set up to
disagree). However, Ramban takes Rashi's
approach one step
further, demonstrating that what Rashi
considers 'drash' may
be not only 'pshat', but should even be
counted as one of the
613 mitzvot!
"In my opinion this [commandment of zachor
in pasuk 24:9]
should be considered a positive commandment
- [i.e. it
should be counted as] an actual mitzvat
aseh" [see Ramban
24:9].
To our amazement, Ramban considers
zachor - what appeared
to be simply a 'reminder' - as a positive
commandment to daily
remember (or possibly even recite) the
incident involving how
Miriam contracted tzara'at after speaking
about her brother.
How does Ramban reach such a daring
conclusion that this
should be counted as one of the 613 mitzvot!?
One could suggest that Ramban's approach
stems from his
'sensitive ear' to the Torah's use of key
phrases. When
Ramban hears the opening phrase: "Zachor et
asher asa
Hashem..." he is immediately reminded of
three other instances
where the Torah introduces a mitzva with a
similar expression:
* 1) Shabbat - "Zachor et yom ha-shabbat"
(Shmot 20:7)
* 2) Yetziat Mitzrayim - "Zachor et
ha-yom..." (Shmot 13:3)
* 3) amalek - "Zachor et asher asa lecha
Amalek..."
(see Devarim 25:17)
Ramban cites these three examples as
proof that a pasuk
beginning with the word zachor... constitutes
a positive
commandment (a 'mitzvat aseh'); and hence,
our case should be
no different.
But what is this mitzva? Why would the
Torah have us
remember a 'not so nice' story about Miriam?
Like an artist, Ramban beautifully 'puts
all the pieces
together,' explaining this seemingly
enigmatic pasuk in light
of our earlier questions. Like Rashi and Ibn
Ezra, he points
to lashon ha-ra as the central topic of these
psukim. This is
why the incident of Miriam is introduced and
why the issue of
tzara'at is mentioned altogether in Parshat
Ki-Tetzeh, in the
context of mitzvot bein adam le-chavero.
However, Ramban's interpretation also
explains the advantage
of employing Miriam to present this mitzva
(rather than
stating it explicitly):
"... Hence, this is a warning (of the
Torah) not to speak
lashon ha-ra, commanding us to remember the
terrible
punishment that Miriam received [even
though she was] a
righteous prophetess, and she spoke only
about her
brother (not someone outside the family)
and only
privately with her brother (Aharon), not in
public, so
that Moshe himself would not be
embarrassed... But
despite these good intentions, she was
punished. How
much more so must we be careful never to
speak lashon ha-
ra... (see Ramban 24:9).
According to Ramban, the Torah doesn't
mention Miriam to
tell us how bad her sin was. On the
contrary, the incident of
Miriam (who, as everyone knows, was righteous
and had only
good intentions) emphasizes how careful we
must all be in all
matters which may involve even the slightest
degree of lashon
ha-ra. This pasuk reminds us that punishment
was administered
even in the case of Miriam's mild lashon
ha-ra.
Based on the parallel to other instances
of the word
zachor, the Ramban concludes that mere
recollection does not
suffice. We are obligated to verbally
recount this
unfortunate incident every day [just as
Kiddush on Shabbat
fulfills the obligation of 'zachor et yom
ha-shabbat
lekadsho...']! Ramban understands these
psukim as not merely
some good advice, but as a commandment to
retell this incident
on a daily basis, in order that we remember
not to make a
similar mistake, even should we have 'good
intentions'.
[See also Sifra on Vayikra 26:14 [Torat
Kohanim
Bechukotai Alef 2-3]. This probably
explains the
'minhag' [custom] of reciting this pasuk
each day after
shacharit - see the six 'zechirot' at the
conclusion of
shacharit in your siddur!]
Ramban's closing remarks are most
significant, as they
reflect another important aspect of his
exegetical approach:
"For how could it be that lashon ha-ra -
which is
equivalent in its severity to murder -
would not be
considered a [full fledged] mitzva in the
Torah! ...
Rather, this pasuk serves as a serious
warning to
refrain [from lashon ha-ra], be it in
public or in
private, intentional or unintentional...and
it should be
considered one of the 613 mitzvot..." (see
Ramban 24:9).
Ramban here employs 'conceptual logic' -
the very essence
of his pshat approach - to support his
comprehensive
interpretation of these psukim. Because
logically there must
be a mitzva in the Torah against speaking
lashon ha-ra, Ramban
prefers to interpret this pasuk as one of the
613 mitzvot.
In this manner, Ramban utilizes a wider
perspective of pshat
to reach a conclusion not only similar to the
Midrash, but
also more poignant.
[If you would like to see an 'enhanced
version' of
Ramban's explanation of this mitzva, read
his commentary
to Rambam's Sefer Ha-mitzvot. At the
conclusion of the
'mitzvot aseh' section, Ramban adds several
mitzvot which
(in his opinion) Rambam had overlooked. In
'hasaga' #7,
Ramban adds this mitzva, that we must
constantly remind
ourselves of the incident of Miriam in
order to remember
not to speak lashon ha-ra.]
An 'AM' KADOSH with a 'PEH' KADOSH
Note as well that according to Ramban's
interpretation,
the mitzva which emerges from these two
psukim in Parshat Ki
Tetzeh is not only yet another mitzva bein
adam le-chavero, it
also forms one of the most basic 'building
block' towards
achieving the ultimate goal of Sefer Devarim
to create and
establish an am kadosh.
Recall how the mitzvot of the main speech
form the
guidelines for the establishment of God's
model nation in the
land of Israel. Imagine an entire nation,
where each
individual reminded himself daily of these
stringent
guidelines concerning lashon ha-ra!
Anyone who would like to be 'machmir'
[adhere to a more
stringent opinion] - especially on the
'de-'oraita' level, is
invited to take upon himself this 'chumra'
[stringency]
explicated by Ramban.
shabbat shalom,
menachem
==========================
FOR FURTHER IYUN
A. Try to arrange the various opinions of
the Rishonim
mentioned above into the following
categories. Who considers:
1) 24:8 is the primary pasuk - 24:9
supports it.
2) 24:9 is the primary pasuk - 24:8
introduces it.
3) 24:8-9 should be read together, like
one long pasuk.
B. Carefully review Rashbam and Chizkuni's
comments on our
psukim. According to them, to whom is the
prohibition in 24:8
directed? According to Rashi / Ramban?
A corresponding debate exists regarding
Vayikra 13:2: "Ve-
huva el Aharon ha-kohen." ("He shall be
brought before
Aharon."). See Sefer Hachinuch 169 as
opposed to the Rosh's
commentary on Masechet Zavim 3:2.
C. We noted Chazal's Midrash Halacha that
interprets the
first of our two psukim as forbidding the
surgical detachment
of a tzara'at infection. As we pointed out,
Rashi adopts this
peirush of that pasuk, despite the fact that
he understands
the reference to tzara'at here as primarily
related to lashon
ha-ra.
The question, of course, arises, why
would the Torah
mention specifically this particular detail
of the laws of
tzara'at if the main focus here is on lashon
ha-ra? Why is
this prohibition singled out from all of
hilchot tzara'at for
mention here in the context of the
prohibition of lashon ha-
ra?
Try to answer this question by reviewing
the general
process imposed upon the metzora. See Rashi,
Vayikra 13:47 &
14:4. In light of this, explain the
prohibition of removing a
tzara'at infection and how this may reflect
the severity of
lashon ha-ra. Bear in mind as well that the
Ramban here
(24:8) extends this prohibition beyond
severing the infection,
to mere refusal to show it to the kohen (thus
avoiding the
entire process).
In honor of Elul, relate this concept to
the process of
'teshuva' in general.
D. Those Rishonim who do not derive the
prohibition of
removing a tzara'at infection from 24:8 (as
the Gemara in
Makkot does) would presumably derive the
prohibition from
Vayikra 13:33 - see Torat Kohanim there.
Based on the context
of that pasuk, what advantage is there to
learning the
prohibition from our pasuk instead? What
might be the
difference between these two prohibitions?
See Sefer
Hachinuch 170, as opposed to Ramban in his
'hasagot' to
Rambam's Sefer Hamitzvot lo ta'aseh 307-8.
[There is also some
question as to the precise text of that
passage in Torat
Kohanim - see Sefer Hachinuch's citation of
Torat Kohanim in
mitzva 170 and Torah Shleima, Vayikra
13:109.]
E. Recall that according to Rashbam and
Chizkuni, 24:9
teaches us not to make exceptions for public
figures with
regard to the laws of tzara'at. Review their
comments and
note that the 'hava amina' (original
possibility) of exempting
leaders from these laws evolved from the
honor and respect due
to them. We may, however, add another
element to this hava
amina: national interests. A nation would
understandably be
very reluctant to quarantine an important
public official for
an indefinite period of time. Explain how,
along the lines of
the Rashbam & Chizkuni but with our
variation, we may explain
a seemingly superfluous phrase in the pasuk:
". on your
journey when you left the land of Egypt."
(For a subtle hint,
see Targum Yonatan's explanation of this
phrase.) Consider
especially the final clause of Bemidbar
12:15. (If you want
to cheat, look up Rav Zalman Sorotzkin's
'Oznayim La-Torah' on
our pasuk.)
F. For an interesting twist, see Targum
Yonatan Ben Uziel on
24:9. According to his understanding, what
sin does this
pasuk address? Is this wrongdoing related to
lashon ha-ra?
Based on this Targum Yonatan, explain more
fully Rashi's
comments on Shemot 4:6.
G. Note that the mitzva of 'kil'ayim' (see
22:9-12) is
another mitzva bein adam la-Makom, and hence
seems out of
place in Parshat Ki Tetzeh. Based on the
various laws
concerning forbidden marriages which continue
in 22:13-23:9,
can you suggest a thematic connection between
these mitzvot?
In this context, note Ramban's
association between the
prohibition of plowing with an ox and donkey
(pasuk 10) and
that of interbreeding (Vayikra 19:19). See
also Rambam, Moreh
Nevuchim 3:49, who explicitly bases the
prohibition here with
the halacha forbidding interbreeding.
[Regarding sha'atnez,
however, he offers a much different
explanation - Moreh
Nevuchim 3:37.]
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mail.atlchai.org/pipermail/par-reg/attachments/20140904/12d8c5ee/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: kitey2.pdf
Type: application/pdf
Size: 39602 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://mail.atlchai.org/pipermail/par-reg/attachments/20140904/12d8c5ee/attachment-0001.pdf>
More information about the Par-reg
mailing list